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Notes on Raising and Allocating Central Government Revenues
L. G. Reynolds
These are working notes intended to raise research problems rather than to
present new findings.

They rest partly on a canvass of the literature, partly on discussions

with fiscal and planning officials in a considerable number of LDC' s.

I am concerned only

with central government finance, not with the problems which arise in a few of the larger
LDC's with federal systems.

I shall touch briefly on the objectives of fiscal policy, the

design of public revenues, the facts of revenue-expenditure behavior, problems of the
capital account, and mechanisms for revenue allocation.
1.

Objectives of fiscal policy

It is sometimes said that the study of economic development is simply an
extension of familiar branches of applied economics, such as agricultural economics or
international economics, to a new spectrum of economies.

There is something to this.

But it is at best a half-truth, and public finance provides a good illustration.

Anyone

reared on the Western public finance literature must re-think his subject substantially to
cope with the economic structure and policy priorities of the LDC' s.
First, the relative importance of the various fiscal functions is substantially
different.

Using Musgrave' s threefold schema, the distributional and (probably) the

stabilization functions are relatively less important in the LDC' s than in the MDC' s.

On

the other hand, the incentive functions, the resource enlargement functions, and the
allocative functions of the fiscal system are substantially more important.

(Musgrave,

incidentally, does not distinguish promotion of growth as a separate fiscal objective.

It

should perhaps be so distinguished for present purposes.)
Plan documents and Finance Ministry officials often seem to be saying that the
purpose of the fiscal system is simply to raise revenue.

This is a myopic view.

Taxes and

-2expenditures have strong feedback effects on the private sector, as Hymer and Resnick
correctly point out.

The financing of the public sector is not a separable problem, which

can be carved out neatly from the rest of the economy.

It is an inextricable part of the larger

problem of moving the whole economy forward through time in a desired manner.
The fiscal system should be viewed first and foremost as a regulatory
mechanism, 1 a way of paying people for doing (and penalizing them for not doing) things
which are in the general economic interest.

In each area of taxation, incentive and alloca-

tive effects should be in the forefront of attention, revenue yields in the background. Revenm
requirements can of course not be ignored.

But very often the same revenue yield can be

obtained from a variety of tax structures whose allocative effects are quite different, and
among which choice can be made on allocative grounds.
One of the striking things about Western public finance is that we still know
remarkably little about how different tax structures affect the economic decisions of
individuals and business concerns.

Fresh investigation of these matters in the LDC I s would

strengthen the general body of economic knowledge, in addition to its policy usefulness
within the LDC' s.
The main focus of tax studies should probably be on taxes which bulk large in
the fiscal systems of the LDC I s.
increase gradually in importance.

Personal and corporate income taxes will doubtless
For the time being, however, the most interesting areas

seem to be:
(1) Land taxes and other taxes on agricultural income.

The literature here is

very thin and practice is highly unsatisfactory;
1 For a good statement of this view, with some applications to Pakistan, see Stephen R.
Lewis, Jr., "Aspects of fiscal policy and resource mobilization in Pakistan,
Pakistan
Development Review, Summer 1964.
11

-3(Z) Export and import ta}:ation, including tax-like devices such as marketing
schemes and exchange centrals.

Here again it is clear that past practice has had erratic

and even perverse economic results.
(3)

Excises a.nd other commodity taxes which are bound to be important at an

early stage of politico-economic development_. and which even in principle may not be as
inferior as has sometimes been supposed.
_?. _ . 'J:'he de si.9..:n of public revenues

Havin:;; said tlTJ.t the fiscal system should not be regarded raainly as a way of
raising revenues, we novv reverse ourselvas to consider its revenue aspect.

Assume for

the mome1:1t ttat government expenditure will rise relative to national income in a growing
What problems are involved in devising a fiscal system which will keep

econo:r.y...

revenues in line v,ifo expenditures?

Such a system, in which revenues also rise faster

than national income, we sh~J.l term elastic.

Conversely, a system whose yield rises less

l

rapidly than national incorr.e, is_i:.!If~lastic, On2 must dist!n9T1ish~x ante elasticity from ex e_ost elasticity.

A fiscal system

is elastic ex ant~ if revenues rise faster than national income with no change in the
number of taxes, the definition of the base for each tax, or the rate schedule for each tax.
Even if the system i.s belc:stic in this sense, it: can be made elastic ~_12ost by adding new
taxes, changing tax b1.ses and rate structures, or imprnving the ratio of taxes collected to
taxes due.

Most countries do all these things in varying degree.

with the tax structure hc1s disadvantages.

But frequent tinkering

The need for yea.r-to-year patchwork measures

can be reduced by comprehensive revievr and redesign of the tax system so that it will
have the desired degree of elasticity ex ~nte,

1 Note that these definitions arc not unambiguous; for they may relate to government
revenue relative to tot::1.l income in the economy, or to monetized income only. Monetized
income presumably rises faster than total income as development proceeds. So a system
which is inelastic ·with respect to monetized income may still be elastic as regards total
income.
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The ex ante elasticity of a particular tax depends, first on the elasticity of the
base on which the tax is assessed and, second, on the rate schedule.

A progressive rate

schedule can make the yield of a tax elastic even though its base is not.

Since the

elasticity of particular taxes varies, the elasticity of the enUr.e sys-Gem depends on the
tax mix.
Estimates of ex ante elasticity at a particular time and place require projections
of national output and its main components.

The income side of the accounts must be

developed in enough detail to separate out, for example, agricultural income, profit income,
and wage-salary income; and preferably to permit estimates of income distribution by size
classes.

Given this, tax base behavior can be projected for each tax; and this, in con-

junction with rate schedules, permits a projection of tax yields.
Published estimates of this kind are rare.

1

One may surmise that they would

often show revenues to be inelastic ex ante, mainly because most LDC's rely so heavily on
commodity taxes, export and import taxes, and primitive forms of land taxation.

This

presents an obvious problem of fiscal re-design.
As a basis for such re-design, one needs further estimates of the consequences
of changing tax base definitions, changing rate structures, adding new taxes, and so on.
From this, one can develop a picture of a reformed tax system which would have the degree
of elasticity deemed necessary--!. 1, or 1. 2, or whatever.

2

One can, in fact, develop a

1 For one careful study, originally a Yale Ph.Dthesis, see Dharam P. Ghai, Taxation for
Development: A Case Study of Uganda, Nairobi, East Africa Publishing House, 1966.

2Actual ex post elasticities, achieved partly by trimming and patching are perhaps of the
order of 1. 3. Williamson found a revenue elasticity of 1. 29 relative to GNP. Thorn found
an expenditure elasticity of 1. 3. These were cross-section studies, however, and covered
a wide range of incomes up to and including the United States. Further analysis is clearly
necessary to reach any firm conclusions for the LDC' s proper.

-5variety of "tax packages," each of which would show the desired behavior of revenues.
Choice among these would depend on the non-revenue considerations emphasized in the
preceding section.
3.

Revenue-expenditure behavior

There has been a good deal of quantitative analysis of government revenues
and expenditures, kicked off by the Lewis-Martin paper a decade ago, and continuing
through more recent studies by Hinrichs, Stephen Lewis, Thorn, and others.

1

This is also

a favorite topic for analysis in publications of the U. N. regional economic commissions.
There is still much that is unknown, however, and some of the past work
appears rather confused.

It is common, for example, to make international comparisons of

government outlays including transfer payments.
seem to be the proper measure of public output.

Exhaustive expenditures, however, would
Transfer payments, as a percentage of

GNP, are much larger in the MDC's than in the LDC's.

2

Thus shifting to an exhaustive

expenditure basis considerably reduces the gap between MDC's and LDC's.

If transfer

payments are excluded, Thorn finds that, in countries with per capita income above $1,200,
government expenditures average 20. 6 percent of GNP.
incomes below $200, the figure is 14. 9 percent.

For countries with per capita

About half of this gap arises from heavier

defense expenditures in the high-income countries.
1

Harley H. Hinrichs, "Determinants of government revenue shares among less developed
countries," Economic Journal, September 1965; Stephen R. Lewis, Jr., "Government revenue
from foreign trade: an international comparison, " Manchester School, January 1963;
Richard S. Thorn, "The evolution of public finances during economic development, "
Manchester School, January 1967; U. Tun ·wai, "Taxation problems and policies of under
developed countries," IMF Staff Papers, November 1962; Jeffery G. Vl/illiamson, "Public
expenditure and revenue: an international comparison, " Manchester School, January 1961.
2

Thorn finds that transfers to households average 6. 7 percent of GNP for countries with per
capita income of $1, 200 or more, but only 1. 0 percent of GNP for countries with per capita
income of $200 or less.

-6The commone st kind of study has been cross-sec tion analysis of countries at all
levels of income, from Uganda to the United States; and certain standard relations are found.
Even after all reasonabl e correctio ns, the richer countries raise and spend a higher propor
tion of GNP than the poor countries , they get a larger proportio n of their revenues from
direct taxation, and so on.

But some of the studies yield rather unexpect ed results.

For

example, Hinrich's regressio n analysis for sixty countries shows a strong relation between
tax revenue as a percent of GNP (R/Y) and per capita income (Y/N) for the group as a whole.
When the countries are stratified by income-l evel, however, there is no significan t relation
between R/Y and Y/N within the group of countries with Y/N of $300 and below, or within
the group with Y/N of $750 and above.

Only in the intermedi ate group, with Y/N of $300-

$750, does the relation remain.
For the poorest group of countries , there is a significan t relation between R/Y
and the openness of the economy, as indicated by M/Y.

The apparent lack of a relation

with Y/N may mean either that there is no relation, or that the relation is obscured by poor
measurem ents of GNP.
These cross-sec tion results clearly need to be compleme nted by analyzing the
behavior of R/Y in individua l LDC' s over extended periods of time.

As more of the EGG

country studies are complete d, this sort of comparat ive analysis will become increasin gly
feasible.
In addition to analyzing governme nt revenues and expenditu res in toto, it would
seem profitable to analyze each major category of expenditu re separatel y.
expenditu re probably has its own laws of motion.
elasticity of demand for education .

Each type of

It is plausible to hypothes ize an income

But it is not so clear why there should be an elasticity
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of demand for defense,

Some expenditure categories may reflect officials' preferences 1

rather than citizens' preferences.,

So it seems desirable to analyze separately the

determinants of expenditure on defense, urban services, education, health, and so on.
These may turn out to behave rather differently with respect to national income and other

.
2
variables.
4.

The Capital Account; Government Saving

Here one must distinguish between general government and_ the public sector,
including public enterprises.

The economics of public enterprises is a large subject,

including such problems as pricing policy, profit calculations and _profit targets, investment policy, and sources of investment finance.

w·e leave these issues aside and con

sider the capital account of general government, public enterprises entering only insofar
as they contribnte profits or require subsidies.
Government saving out of current revenue is usually expected to be an important
source of capital formation in the LDC's.

Performance on this front is viewed by aid

agencies as an important indicator of "self--help."
a large conventional element.

But the usual measures of saving have

This is so because the definition of current expenditure,

1

There is a growing body of literature on the economics of the large corporation, which
attempts to specify managers' preferences in a way amenable to statistical tests. See,
for example, J. E. W"illiamson, "Managerial discretion and business behavior,"
American Economic Review, December 1963; R, J. Monsen, Jr. and Anthony Downs, "A
theory of large managerial firms," Journal of PoU.tical Economy, June 1965. There is also
a considerable lit(c!rature on "planners' preferences" in Soviet-type economies; which may
have some relevance to government decision-making in the LDC' s.
2

see on this point Frederic Pryor' s comparison of selected expenditure items in a half
dozen capitalist and socialist countries. He found it necessary to tailor a separate theory
for each item; and he found also that a country's economic system was less significant
than per capita income and other conventional variables. (British edition: Allen and
Unwin, 1968; American edition, Richard D. Irwin, 1968).
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which is subtracted from current revenue to get the savings figure, is itself conventional.
The conventions may vary considerably from country to country.

Moreover, part of what is

counted as current expenditure resembles physical capital formation in contributing to
higher output in future years (for example, research, part of educational expenditure, part
of public health expenditure).

Thus it is possible that country A, which has a lower

government saving ratio than country B, may actually be spending more in productivity
raising directions.
Waiving this difficulty, it would be useful to examine the behavior of
conventionally-defined average and marginal savings rates in a variety of LDC' s.

The

targets in development plans are usually ambitious, often specifying a marginal savings
rate well above pa st average performance.

What does such a marginal rate mean?

It is

not a built-in characteristic of the system, derived from supposedly stable functions, like
the marginal propensity to consume, or the marginal revenue yield from a given tax
structure.

Viewed ex ante, it is an expression of intent.

Viewed (more significantly)

ex post, it is an indicator of revenue performance and of government's success in resisting
demands for current expenditure.
The difficulty of increasing, or even maintaini_ng, the average savings rate is
obvious-.
revenues.
year.

The army and the police are powerful claimants for any increase in current
Beyond this, government is usually under pressure to raise salaries year by

Since salaries constitute the bulk of current expenditure, the rate of salary increase

is critically important.

If the elasticity of the revenue system is near unity, but the rate

of salary increase is substantially above the rate of GNP increase, any margin for govern
ment saving will be eroded over time.
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Houthakker concludes, from a cross-section analysis of 28 countries ranging in
income from the U. S. A. to the Republic of the Congo, that the percentage of current revenue
saved is about the same at all income levels. 1

More surprisingly, Thorn's cross-section

study finds that the percentage of current revenue saved is substantially higher in the low
income countries. 2

Eliminating transfer payments would reduce the difference but would by

no means eliminate it.

The two studies appear contradictory, and neither result is what one

might hq,ve expected a priori.

This suggests a need for further study.

Specifically, it

would be useful to have time-series analyses for as many LDC's as possible, over as long
a period as possible.
The anslysis should of course go beyond government saving to include other items
on the resources side of the capital account: transfers from public enterprises, domestic
borrowing, foreign borrowing, money creation.

The behavior over time of government

capital formation, and of these main sources of finance, would be highly interesting.
even broader undertaking would be to trace the behavior of "development expenditure,

An
11

whether or not directed toward physical capital formation, and the sources of finance for
such expenditure.

The concept of development expenditure is fuzzy, however, and its

content varies from country to country.

So while experimentation in this direction would be

useful, one might or might not get significant results.
1 His relation is

s90v = O. 107

G
(0. 014)
where G is current revenue per capita and Sgov is government saving per capita. H. S.
Houthakker, "On some determinants of saving in developed and underdeveloped countries,"
in E. A. G. Robinson (ed.) Problems in Economic Development (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1965), pp. 212-30.
2

For countries with per capita income above $1,200, current revenue averages 27. 3 percent
of GNP, and government saving 3 percent of GNP, i.e. government saving is about one-ninth
of revenue. For countries with per capita income below $200, the corresponding figures are
15. 9 percent and 3. 2 percent, i.e. government saving is one-fifth of revenue.
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5.

Revenue Allocation: Planning and Budgeting

Much of the development literature implies that, H only enough revenue can be
raised, efficient allocation can be taken for granted.

Somewhere in the government

apparatus there is assumed to be a coordinator, who has enough knowledge to equate cost
benefit ratios at the margin and enough authority to direct expenditures accordingly.
This is of course not an accurate picture even in the relatively well-organized
American government.
programs.

1

Our annual budget review concentrates on increments to existing

Just as old taxes are said to be good taxes, old expenditures are presumed to

be warranted.

Action on the increments also leaves much to be desired.

The good

economists in the Bureau of the Budget are not able to accomplish many things which
technical analysis suggests should be done. 2
Allocation difficulties are even more serious in the LDC's.
the Minister of Finance is traditionally a powerful figure.
authorizes release of funds for expenditure.

In most countries,

He collects revenues, and

He prepares estimates of future revenue,

which presents obvious possibilities of gamesmanship.

If there is an organization to

review departmental requests, a budget bureau, it is also traditionally located in the
Ministry of Finance.

Allocations are decided by negotiations between the Minister con-

cerned, the Finance Minister, and on large matters the Prime Minister or President.

They

are influenced by the aggressiveness and bargaining positions of individual ministers, and
also by the strength of their technical staffs.

There may or may not be any serious

1 It can be argued, of course, that this will yield
correct results if done carefully and over
a sufficiently long period. If the budget is growing over time, and if increments are
correctly managed, totals will come out about right. It can also be argued that, given the
limitations of knowledge in the hands of a central decision-maker , simultaneous reconsider
ation of the whole expenditure pattern is unfeasible, and "incremental decision-makin g"
will yield superior results. This line of thought has been well developed by Lindblom and
others.
2 For a sophisticated and entertaining analysis of U.S. federal budget making, see Aaron
Wildovsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964).

-11legislative review.

In the Philippines, for example, it is customary for the legislature to

approve expenditure proposals far in excess of prospective revenues.

Which projects are

actually undertaken is then decided within the executive branch.
Planning organizations are relatively new agencies grafted onto this preexisting framework.

The main operational problem of a planning agency is to insert itself

into the mainstream of budget decisions, an effort which is likely to be resisted by the
Finance Minister and others, and which cannot succeed without top-level support.

To the

extent that the effort is successful, however, the planning group may be able to improve 1
allocative procedures in several ways:
(1) Urging {and training) the various departments to prepare better project
designs and more careful budget justifications.
(2) Requiring departments to project their spending requirements for some years
in the future.

This is obviously necessary for multi-year capital construction projects, but

it is desirable for every kind of expenditure.

Capital expenditures normally generate a

stream of current operating expenditure for future years, which must be considered in
longer-range planning.
{3} Accomplishing a separation between "developmental" and other expenditures.
The economic justification for such a division is not too clear, but it can be a useful
strategic device.

Since development is "good II by definition, listing an item on the

development side of the budget probably makes it more likely that funds will be forthcoming.
Moreover, since the planning agency is the special guardian of the development budget,
1 This is a tendentious word, perhaps indicating no more than an economist's bias toward
considering it "good" that more economists should be involved in budget making and that
economic criteria for allocation should be given greater weight.
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increasing the relative size of that budget tends to increase the planners' influence in
budget making.
A common arrangemen t is that the planning organizatio n revisw,a all develop
ment expenditure s, while other expenditure s are reviewed by a budget agency in the
Finance Ministry or elsewhere.

This is of course an ambiguous arrangemen t.

To the

extent that the Finance Ministry, the Defense Ministry, etc. determine the size of the
"regular 11 budget, they also determine how much is available for developmen t.

But while

separate authority over the developmen t budget is not a guarantee that developmen t needs
will have high priority, it is useful in strengthenin g the bargaining position of the planning
group.
(t:1) Improving the annual allocation decisions by achieving greater year-to-yea r

consistency , better inter-depar tmental coordinatio n of projects (for example, on a regional
basis), and by relating specific expenditure items to general developmen t strategy.
(5) Installing systematic follow-up on project execution rates, and on

deviations of actual from budgeted expenditure s.

Knowing what happened last year is

obviously helpful. in budgeting for next year, but this simple requirement is often neglected
in practice.
This is a proper, indeed a necessary, area of research for economists .

To

paraphrase a famous saying, "Governmen t is too important to be left to students of govern
ment.

11

Different budgetary procedures have different allocative results, and can make a

substantial difference to the current efficiency and future growth rate of the economy.
Specialists in public administrat ion tend, I think, to regard government al organizatio n as
almost an end in itself, a self-contain ed object of study.

To the economist, organizatio n

-13is instrumental, and the interesting question is how well it serves efficiency goals which
we can define with some precision.

It would be useful to have country-by-country studies,

not of budgeting machinery per se, but of the allocations which come out of the budget
procedure, and of the apparent relation between procedure and results.
so far as I can see, are likely to do sophisticated work of this sort.

Only economists,

